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Turkish Economic Development:
The First Five Year Plan, 1963-67
By Wayne W. Snyder*
SUMMARY
This article evaluates the effectiveness of Turkey's First Five Year
Development Plan (1963-67) in achieving both its domestic and its
international objectives.
A target of 7 per cent for the G.N.P. growth rate was nearly achieved,
but individual sectors diverged from the plan. Agricultural and manu-
facturing output increased only about three-quarters as fast as planned,
while the construction and service industries exceeded the planned rate.
In agriculture, neither new investment nor, more important, the dis-
semination of new techniques proceeded as rapidly as expected. In-
sufficient amounts of well-organized investment projects, foreign exchange,
and domestic savings (especially in the public sector) impeded the full
achievement of the desired manufacturing capacity. In addition to failing
to raise public revenue as much as planned, the principal shortcomings in
policy formulation and execution were an overvalued currency which
necessitated exchange controls and distorted the allocation of resources,
the continued reliance on price regulation, and the failure to reform
adequately the State Economic Enterprises. Reliance on foreign aid was
reduced, but more aid will still be required before sustained growth is
achieved.
In spite of these shortcomings, substantial progress was accomplished
during the First Plan without the inflationary pressures and other im-
balances which characterized the 1950s. However, Turkey could be
developed more rapidly if more appropriate policies were followed.
Forty years ago Kemal Atatiirk began the transformation of Turkey
into a modern industrialized nation, a task which was interrupted by his
death and the Second World War. While progress was renewed in the
1950s, it was accompanied by substantial inflation and other imbalances,
factors which eventually contributed to the 1960 revolution.
Less than a month after the May 1960 revolution, a seventeen-man
cabinet, composed almost entirely of civilian technicians, forwarded to
the Turkish military junta a list of fifteen matters requiring urgent atten-
tion; eleven were directly related to economic matters.' One of the junta's
earliest acts was to create a State Planning Organization (S.P.O.) and
direct it to prepare a fifteen-year development programme, and when a
new constitution was approved by a national referendum it formally
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incorporated the principle that 'economic, social and cultural develop-
ment would henceforth be based on a plan', prepared and executed by
the newly formed S.P.O.2 The general objectives of this programme, and
the aspirations, targets, strategies, and policies of its initial instrument, the
First Five Year Development Plan (1963-67) were described at the
beginning of the first plan period,3 but little has been written on what has
actually happened. My purpose here is to evaluate how effective the First
Plan's policies have been in achieving both domestic and international
objectives and to suggest some implications of this experience, after
briefly recalling the conditions which prevailed in Turkey during the
1950s and the structure of the planning system instituted after the 1960
revolution.
I
The decade which ended with the 1960 revolution included unprece-
dentedly rapid economic growth, but this was accompanied by erratic
and distorted development. With the population growing by about 3 per
cent annually and G.N.P. by over 5 per cent, between 1950 and 1960 per
capita income increased substantially. Growth was considerably faster up
to 1955, however, when the amount of cereal-producing land was ex-
panded greatly by cultivating most of the State, unowned and village
common grazing pastures, without any noticeable increase in crop yields,
a once-for-all process.4 Public expenditures were maintained at a high
level and considerable progress was undeniably achieved in providing a
broad infrastructure upon which a sound future could be built, but it is
equally true that a near phobia against planning prevailed which led to a
wasteful use of Turkey's scarce resources. The immediate effects were
inflation and balance of payment deficits which used up all of Turkey's
international reserves and contributed to an accumulation of U.S. $1
billion in foreign debts. Although a stabilization programme was half-
heartedly begun in late 1958, by the eve of the revolution Turkey was
virtually bankrupt and was heading towards political and economic
disaster at an ever increasing rate. Immediately following the revolution,
the junta gave a high priority to economic planning, perhaps-as has been
suggested elsewhere-because it was composed principally of military
men for whom planning was a cardinal principle.5
The plan organization consists of two bodies, the High Planning
Council and the S.P.O. itself. The S.P.O. is unusual by world planning
standards in that it is quasi-political although formally staffed by civil
servants. Its executive organ, the High Planning Council, is composed of
the Prime Minister or his deputy, three ministers elected by the Cabinet,
the head of the S.P.O. (Under-Secretary for Planning, nominally a civil
service post), and the heads of its three departments: Economic Planning,
Social Planning and Co-ordination. Thus the principal directors of the
S.P.O. are not only responsible for recommending economic policies, but
through their own participation on the High Planning Council they are
charged with approving policies-at least so far as decisions of the High
Planning Council bind the government itself. This ambiguous situation,
midway between political and non-political, has been a continual source
of frustration to the directors of the S.P.O. Understandably, the Parliament
has not always approved the proposals made by the S.P.O. and the
resulting confficts have led to a series of resignations by S.P.O. officials
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which has seriously undermined the initial enthusiasm with which econo-
mic planning was begun. A typical example of the kind of problem which
has occurred is discussed in the next section.
II
Except for the specific target of 7 per cent for the G.N.P. growth rate,
most of the other objectives of the fifteen year development programme
were left rather vague, e.g. 'to keep migration to the cities on a level with
new jobs' and 'to give modest dwellings preference' and 'achieve equality
both between groups and regions'.6 The First Plan, for 1963-67, contained
a much more specific set of objectives designed to achieve the growth
target. Rates of investment and its composition, consumption, output, and
public revenue and expenditure were determined by means of a macro-
economic growth model, based on previous trends and adjusted for the
structural changes incorporated in the plan. One result of this approach
was that the First Plan was much more a set of consistent economic
relationships than a detailed investment programme. The planners did
not have time to prepare the sectoral studies necessary for a complete
investment programme. Specific sectoral investment targets and particular
project proposals were left to be determined in a series of official annual
programmes to implement the First Plan. Throughout the plan period,
however, the lack of well-organized investment opportunity surveys re-
mained a major bottleneck and was one of the reasons why planned in-
vestment in the public sector failed to reach the planned level and why the
allocation of private investment diverged from the intended pattern.
Another reason for the gap between actual and planned investment was
that neither public revenue nor saving reached the intended level, al-
though a principal strategy of the First Plan was to raise both by intro-
ducing new taxes and increasing some tax rates while holding the growth
of current expenditures in line with G.N.P. itself. The new taxes and
changed rates were expected to come into effect during 1962 and 1963,
raising the total level of domestic revenue from a fairly stable average of
13 per cent of G.N.P. during the 1950s to 19 per cent by 1963. Afterwards,
the new taxation structure was intended to provide at least an 8 per cent
annual increase, somewhat greater than G.N.P.7 The main new tax
proposed by the S.P.O. was a complicated system of agrarian taxes
(based on an unpublished report by Lord Balogh), justified on social
grounds because agricultural income had not been taxed directly since
the early 1950s, while the existence of large landowners warranted their
supporting a larger share of the national tax burden. While the typical
Turkish farmer is badly off, the distribution of net income earned is very
unequal. In 1952, 70 per cent of the farming families received only 25 per
cent of total agricultural income, while the top 10 per cent received
50 per cent.8
Parliament accepted the First Plan's 7 per cent growth target, but
refused to pass the proposed tax legislation, turning a deaf ear to the
planners' insistence that 'they could not have their cake and eat it too'.
After pointing out this internal inconsistency, the principal personalities
associated with preparing the plan resigned rather than assume re-
sponsibility for what they considered a certain failure.9 This problem of
policy recommendation and partial approval all within the same organiza-
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tion has been an important factor explaining why there have been six
heads of the Economic Planning Department since its creation in 1961.
While the planned upward shift in the total tax schedule was not achieved
in 1962-63, many minor changes were made and together they constituted
the most significant increases in a decade. Individual income tax rates
were increased and the effective corporate tax rate was increased from
23 to 36 per cent. The single most important new revenue, aside from
revised tax rates, has been a compulsory savings bond scheme introduced
in 1962. In addition, many indirect taxes have been increased-principally
those applying to imported commodities-and some new, but less im-
portant, indirect taxes imposed. The new and changed taxes represent an
important effort to implement the First Plan's revenue-raising policy,
although several delays occurred in introducing them. As a result the
upward shift in revenue was neither as large nor as fast as planned; nor
was the marginal tax rate increased as much as planned. By 1967, the
central government's domestic revenue had risen to about 18 per cent
of G.N.P., instead of the 20 per cent target. But while the government
does not have enough revenue to implement fully its planned investment
programme (for which the overall realization has been about 85 per cent
in constant prices), the level of revenue is now substantially higher than
the virtually constant 13 per cent of G.N.P. in the 1950s. By holding
current expenditures to about the planned level of an 8 per cent yearly
increase, and reducing investment, the government avoided large-scale
deficit financing.
The same cannot be said of the State trading agencies, which borrowed
about twice as much from the central bank as the government itself did.
But the combined deficits of the government and the State trading agencies
were not a major source of inflationary pressure which was not large
anyway during the First Plan period. There is another dimension to the
problem of the deficits of the State trading agencies which is at least as
important as their inflationary potential. These deficits result mainly
from the subsidized prices of certain agricultural commodities. For
exported products (e.g. tobacco and hazel nuts) this may be justified by
the high shadow price of foreign exchange, and even the subsidized price
of wheat may help some to reduce demand inflation by encouraging
production. Undoubtedly some price support policies are desirable, but
the choice needs to be made more explicit by providing the subsidies
through the central government budget. Because there are restraints on
the amount of short-term indebtedness to the central banks, the trading
agencies' deficits reduce the amount of funds available to the government
for productive investment or other development projects.
In spite of new laws and policy statements regarding how these and the
other (industrial) State Economic Enterprises (S.E.E.s) should become
'one of the main instruments of the overall development', substantial
improvements have not been realized.10 But neither new laws nor re-
organization committees have yet been able to increase the S.E.E.s
operating efficiency substantially, and ad hoc decisions seem as prevalent
as previously. At the heart of the problem lies the conflict between two
aims of the government: to make the S.E.E.s independent so that they
can effectively compete-where appropriate--with private industry and
generate adequate profits to provide for their own investment growth;
and to assure that the S.E.E.s remain an instrument of the government's
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economic policies. This conflict is common in other countries too, e.g.
Sudan. Resolving this conflict and finding ways for the S.E.E.s to generate
their own financial resources deserves high priority.
There are about 130 S.E.E.s; they produce about one-third of Turkey's
industrial output and annually absorb an equal amount of total investment.
In attempting to procure the maximum return from their investments, the
government created the State Investment Bank (S.I.B.) to evaluate and
assist in the preparation of their investment projects. More recently, the
S.P.O. was given certain veto powers over S.E.E. investment decisions.
Obviously this creates a potential source of conflict with the S.I.B.'s
investment advisory role, but relations between the S.P.O. and the S.I.B.
have been and remain excellent, and perhaps two heads will prove better
than one-certainly the problem's importance merits considerable at-
tention.1"
III
Investment of the public and private sectors is intimately related to the
First Plan's objective to increase Turkey's productive potential and must
be evaluated within the broader framework of policies and their impact
on the achievement of the desired goal. Setting an average growth rate
target is a widely accepted practice in development planning. During the
first five years of formal economic planning, the G.N.P. growth rate
averaged about 6. per cent, thus nearly attaining the First Plan's overall
growth objective. It is, however, necessary to evaluate how much of the
result was due to explicit efforts rather than to exogenous factors, and
whether the development of the different sectors corresponded to their
planned growth.12 Table 1 compares the actual growth of output (at con-
stant 1961 prices) and imports and exports (at current dollar values) with
the corresponding First and Second Plan targets. A notable aspect of the
structural pattern of economic growth was that the overall 7 per cent
target was nearly achieved in spite of the fact that growth rates of both
agriculture and industry were below the planned figures, whereas the
construction and service industries expanded more rapidly than anticipated.
The First Plan estimated that agricultural output would grow by more
than 4 per cent annually. This was 1 per cent higher than the rate achieved
during the period 1948-60 and, more important, substantially above the
1 per cent annual growth realized during the six years immediately
preceding the First Plan, after the expansion of cultivated land had
virtually ceased. This objective was expected to be achieved by policies
designed to increase yields through irrigation, more intensive and ex-
tensive use of fertilizers, and new techniques; neither the total cultivated
area nor the proportion of different crops was expected to change sig-
nificantly. Particular importance was placed on increasing the output
of animal products in order to satisfy increased demands from the rising
population and the improvements in living standards.
The actual growth of agricultural output averaged about 3 per cent
annually, which on the surface suggests a substantial improvement over the
previous six years, even though below the expectation. This interpretation
is deceptive, however, because climatic conditions were on average more
favourable than normal, although variations in production due to this
factor are difficult to evaluate precisely. Furthermore, agricultural per-
formance should not be judged solely on the aggregate level of physical
TABLE 1
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (IN PER CENT)
1948-53 1953-60 1948-60 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1963-1967 1968-72 &
First Second
Actual five-year five-year
plan target plan target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 7
G.N.P.* 7-6 3-4 5-2 7-7 4-9 4-6 9-9 6-2 6-6 7-0 7-0
Agriculture 6-4 1-1 3-3 7-6 0-0 - 3-3 11-4 0.1 3-0 4-2 4-1
Industryt 7-2 4-9 5-8 8-0 8-6 8-9 10-6 11-7 9-7 12.9$ 12-0
Construction 20-2 3-0 8-4 6-1 8-2 6-0 9-4 8-7 7-7 n.a. 7-2
Transportation 11-4 8-5 9-7 8-4 6-3 7-0 8-4 8-3 7-7 10-5 7-2
Exports, f.o.b. 15-0 -3-0 4-2 - 3-2 11-7 12-9 5-6 6-5 9-0 7-1 7-2
Imports, c.i.f. 14-5 -1-8 4.5 10-6 -21-9 6-5 25-5 - 4.7 1-9 4.7 7.4
* Based on constant 1961 prices.
t Mining, manufacturing, electricity, water and gas.
$ Manufacturing only.
Source: Columns (1) to (3) and (10)-First Five- Year Development Plan of Turkey 1963-1967; Columns (4) to (9)-Turkiye Milli Gelir; Column (11)-
Second Five- Year Development Plan of Turkey 1968-72.
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output; the proportions of particular products must also be considered.
For example, too much sugar was produced, because the support price
was maintained artificially and unnecessarily high; and the same may
be true for part of the wheat production. The subsidy to farmers in the
Anatolian plain represents an attempt to compensate them because they
will not benefit from the expansion of irrigation facilities and have no
alternative but to produce wheat or rye under conditions which will
remain difficult for the foreseeable future. The long-term solution to their
problem requires the creation of more productive alternative employment
opportunities, and an eventually reduced labour-to-land ratio. The
relatively successful aggregate growth of agricultural output tends to
mask the fact that agricultural policies were not fully implemented-
indeed the shortfalls in some areas were critical. The investment in dams
outdistanced the ability to use their irrigation potential. Furthermore,
the farmers did not know how to utilize properly the additional water
which was made available. Even more disturbing was the near stagnation
in the production of animal products. The expected growth depended
to a large extent on the increased availability of feeding stuffs, but only
one-tenth of the intended pasture lands were improved. Undoubtedly,
the most important single factor explaining why the agricultural sector
did not fulfil its expected role during the First Plan was the insufficient
increase in the effectiveness of the extension services, which are sub-
divided among many different governmental organizations and are only
weakly linked to agricultural research. Together these factors explain
why agricultural output was less than planned in spite of the more than
average favourable weather conditions. There was some definite progress
in the agricultural sector and the increased use of new wheat varieties
will continue to improve productivity, but unless greater efforts are made
in this and the other important areas mentioned above, shortfalls in
achieving the Second Plan's target might be greater than for the First
Plan.
The average annual increase in industrial output was about 92 per cent,
considerably below the First Plan's 13 per cent target.13 It must be re-
membered, however, that the plan had hoped to more than double the
previous rate of growth (from 6 to 13 per cent); the actual achievement
still represents a notable improvement over the 1950s. Even more en-
couraging is the steady annual rise in the rate of industrial growth from
an 8 per cent increase in 1963 to nearly 12 per cent in 1967. There are no
statistics available on the relative rates of growth for particular manu-
facturing sectors, but S.P.O. investment surveys suggest that the desired
shift to intermediate products and investment goods did not occur and
that new productive capacities were increased more than expected in the
traditional industries such as textiles and food processing. This is not to
deny that there were substantial investments in some basic materials
and investment goods industries. A principal strategy of the First Plan
was to encourage import substitution, and as there was already a virtual
ban on imports of consumer commodities substitution was mainly
concentrated in intermediate goods. (This policy will be discussed in the
next section.)
Since agricultural and industrial output grew less fast than planned
while the overall growth target was nearly achieved, the combined growth
of other sectors must have been higher than foreseen. Unfortunately,
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relatively few details are available about the other sectors. The First Plan
did not set a specific target for construction, but a very low growth rate
is implied in the strategy of discouraging residential building (other than
low-cost, housing) in the hope that private savings would be directed
towards more productive investment. It is certain, however, that the
desired shifting of private investment away from residential construction
did not occur, in spite of certain credit limitations and new taxes. The rate
of growth of all construction activity (of which residential construction
comprises about three-quarters) rose from a 6 per cent increase in 1963
to 10 per cent in 1967. The rapid rise of the urban population (6 per cent
annually as compared with 2 per cent for the rural population)" contri-
butes considerably to the demand for housing-a factor which was not
fully considered in the First Plan.'5 In addition, there is a high propensity
to use private savings for residential investment, since it requires a mini-
mum of entrepreneurship and can be undertaken with amounts which
would be insufficient for an industrial enterprise. Most of the investment
has been in fairly large and expensive apartments, for which the rate of
return has been driven down to a very low level, whereas the great need
is for small, low-cost housing. But the individual investor thinks of the
physical possession rather than potential economic return. Government
measures to overcome these propensities and foster relatively more low-
cost housing have been inadequate, although admittedly it is difficult to
change private behaviour in this area.
There are several other points worth noting about the First Plan's
objectives and policies. Relative price stability, free from controls, was
also an important goal. This was necessary to restore both domestic and
international confidence in Turkey's ability to remain financially stable,
and to assure that its exports would remain competitive. Turkey's exports
stagnated during the last half of the 1950s, largely because they were
priced out of the international markets by inappropriate price and ex-
change rate policies which favoured producing for domestic consumers.
Price control regulations were largely dismantled during late 1962 and
early 1963,16 although nearly 20 per cent of goods and services are still
directly controlled and others are still influenced by the government
through the pricing policies of the State Economic Enterprises (S.E.E.s)
and their trading activities (for example, wheat and sugar beet purchasing).
Consumer prices increased an average of 10 per cent annually between
1950 and 1960, reaching a maximum of over 25 per cent in 1958. During
the plan period, 1963-67, the average rise was about 5 per cent, about
half of which must be attributed to the price decontrols of 1962-63. As this
was comparable with price increases in most other European countries,
Turkey achieved relative price stability. But although the price competitive-
ness of its exports has not deteriorated since 1960, their growth has been
slow and they remain a bottleneck to Turkey's development (see below).
IV
Besides the 7 per cent G.N.P. growth rate, the only other explicit
goal of the fifteen-year development programme was to 'reach a stage
before the end of fifteen years and probably at the end of the second five
years, when she can continue her development efforts without being in
need of exceptional external finance such as foreign aid'.'7 Achieving
B
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this objective depends essentially on three factors: (1) how fast foreign
earnings can be increased; (2) import requirements; and (3) the availa-
bility of sufficient foreign aid during the critical years to enable the country
to acquire the amount of production capacity necessary to subsequently




U.S. $ Million (cumulative)
1963-67 1968-72
Actual First Plan Second Plan
CURRENT ACCOUNT
Imports, c.i.f. -3,191 -3,203 -4,865
Exports, f.o.b. 2,255 2,000 3,115
Trade Balance -944 -1,203 -1,750
Interest payments -157 -99 -282
Tourism (net) -65 18 147
Workers' remittances 287 0 785
Other current items (net) 100 38 2
Total Current Balance -779 -1,246 -1,098
CAPITAL ACCOUNT
Debt repayments -- 641 -567 -468
Direct private investment 113 125 236
Imports without exchange allocation and
short-term suppliers' credits 14 0 80
P.L. 480 (surplus agricultural commodities) 165 290 0
Official capital imports 1,192 1,573 1,400
Reserve changes, errors and omissions, etc. -114 -175 -150
Source: The First (and Second) Five- Year Development Plan, and Tllrkiye Is Bankasi,
Review of Economic Conditions.
Table 2 summarizes the First Plan's balance of payments targets, the
actual results, and the Second Plan's objectives. One of the most encourag-
ing aspects of Turkish economic development is that exports exceeded
the plan target by 10 per cent.18 This favourable development-in striking
contrast to the discouraging performance during the previous decade-
was due to several factors. Good crops and some world price increases
(e.g. tobacco and copper) certainly helped. There also has been a growing
volume of processed goods, helped by the tax rebate system introduced
in late 1963. The expansion of trade under bilateral agreements has also
been a positive factor. Together these contributed to helping the value
of exports attain $250 million more than anticipated, although the worth
of this unforeseen gain was diminished because the terms of trade
deteriorated slightly from 1962 to 1967.
There was an even larger improvement in net invisibles, from an
expected deficit of $43 million to an actual surplus of $165 million.
While tourist earnings were expected to become an important new source
of revenue and a high level of receipts from N.A.T.O. infrastructure
procurements was programmed, neither materialized. The entire per-
formance was due to the unforeseen inflow of $287 million remitted by
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Turkish workers abroad, mainly in Germany. When the plan was being
drawn up in 1961 there were no more than 1,500 Turkish workers abroad
and no substantial increase was foreseen in the plan. By the end of 1967
there were approximately 200,000. Since July 1964 their remittances
have been encouraged by what amounts to a 27 per cent premium, or
an exchange rate of TL 111 per dollar as compared with the official rate
of TL 9 per dollar. This has induced an enormous increase in worker
remittances, although the figures also reflect efforts to circumvent the
overvaluation of the Turkish lira (an issue discussed later in this section).
Since 1953 imports have been regulated by varying degrees of controls
through a system of quotas. Actual imports in 1963-67 were virtually
identical with the First Plan's target,'9 but this does not mean that the
import requirements were perfectly estimated; the composition of imports
deviated from the original intention, and if the investment target had been
fully achieved more imports would have been required. Also, imports
of U.S. surplus commodities (P.L. 480) were hardly more than one-half
the planned amount. This implies that imports of raw and basic materials
were substantially greater than originally intended, as the level of con-
sumer goods remained-as planned-practically constant.
An important pillar of the First Plan's development policies was to
carry out a substantial amount of import substitution ($500 million) in
order to permit maximum growth within the expected availabilities of
foreign exchange.20 While no estimates are available of the amount of
import substitution achieved, the structure of investments suggests that it
fell well below the planned level. More important, however, is the question
of whether policies to encourage import substitution are profitable. One
study, albeit based on a limited sample, concluded that with a liberalized
trade regime and an equilibrium exchange rate, new investment in poten-
tial export industries could produce twice as much output, in value terms,
as is presently being obtained from similar investment in import substitu-
tion schemes.2 ' It is even possible that, at the overvalued exchange rate,
the foreign exchange cost of producing some commodities for domestic
consumption exceeds the cost of importing them. The implications of
this misallocation of Turkey's scarce foreign exchange are disturbing.
Strictly controlled import rationing and licensing and the nearly complete
ban on the importation of consumer goods are the companions of over-
valuation which tends to encourage production for the protected domestic
market and discourage investment in export industries. At any reasonable
estimate of an equilibrium exchange rate, the situation could be reversed
and Turkey's serious balance of payments position could be improved
instead of worsened, although two or three years might be needed before
the benefits were fully realized. The special rate of TL 11-5 per dollar for
Turkish workers' remittances and the more recent (1968) exchange rate
of TL 12 available to tourists are partial steps to remedy this situation,
but neither promotes the required export production. A system of tax
rebates on some exports was begun in 1963, but the advantage of ap-
proximately 10 per cent is inadequate to compensate for the overvaluation
and does nothing to reduce the profitability of investing in industries
where import substitution is undesirable.
Actual gross financial assistance was $500 million less than the First
Plan's estimated requirement of $1,900 million. Other than the anticipa-
tion that U.S. surplus commodity programmes would account for about
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$300 million of this, no statements were made about possible sources of
the required financial assistance. Concurrently with the First Plan's
preparation, however, a Turkish Consortium composed of most of the
members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment was in the process of being created. Understandably, the Turkish
authorities hoped it would approve of their plan and agree to provide the
required aid.
Unlike the I.B.R.D.'s Indian and Pakistan Consortia, which were
specifically conceived to co-ordinate the provision of long-term aid, the
Turkish Consortium created within the O.E.C.D. in 1962 was the product
of a long series of events which can be traced back at least as far as the
settlement of the Ottoman debt in 1923. The European members were
intimately acquainted with Turkey's previous financial crises-most
recently in 1958-when they had been called upon to brace up the economy
and consequently they viewed their role essentially as watchdogs over their
already substantial loans to Turkey rather than as underwriters of a
five-year development plan. The Americans alone were enthusiastic about
the break with the past and the prospects for a sound economic future,
but understandably the other members were sceptical about Turkey's
capacity to manage successfully such an ambitious development pro-
gramme.
The pledging of financial assistance in 1963 foreshadowed what was to
come: the amounts offered were smaller than requested and the terms
harder. Some countries extended little more than supplier credits, evidence
of their primary concern with their own commercial policies rather than
with Turkey's long-term development. By 1964 a pattern was set which
continued throughout the First Plan period, during which gross financial
aid amounted to less than three-quarters of that requested; and nearly
one-half of this was necessary to make repayments on already out-
standing debt. If imports of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities are
excluded (their amount is partially determined by random weather
variations), the First Plan requested $1,006 million in net financial
assistance in addition to $567 million needed to repay debts already
incurred. In fact, Turkey received only $551 million (net), slightly over
half the amount requested.
The substantial shortfall of actual foreign financial aid (either gross or
net) raises the larger issue of the role of the Consortium in helping to
provide financial assistance for Turkey's development aspirations. The
fact that Turkey did manage fairly well to achieve many of the aggregate
development objectives with a level of imports essentially the same as
originally foreseen should not be interpreted to mean that the Consortium
merely adapted its financial aid by providing enough residual exchange to
meet Turkey's legitimate requirements. Without the entirely unforeseen
increase in workers' remittances, Turkey would no doubt have had to
curtail its import programme seriously. It must be noted, however, that
included in the $1,006 million of net financial assistance which Turkey
hoped to receive during the First Plan was U.S. $175 million for building
up Turkey's foreign exchange reserves which have remained at about
$50 million since 1958-not even enough to finance one month's imports.
This was not, however, a purpose which the Consortium members found
acceptable.
Very different amounts of financial assistance were given by the various
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Consortium countries. The net financial assistance of the United States
alone (excluding interest and principal repayments received, debt roll-over,
and the provision of surplus agricultural commodities) amounted to more
than $389 million of the total $551 million in net financial aid which
Turkey received from all Consortium members and multilateral inter-
national agencies combined. Germany and the United Kingdom together
provided about U.S. $50 million net financial aid while the combined
net assistance of the multilateral agencies (I.B.R.D., I.M.F. and E.M.A.)
amounted to U.S. $10-20 million. Thus, clearly the majority of the
Consortium members did not provide Turkey with any net financial aid-
and in fact, principal and interest payments which some countries received
from Turkey exceeded their new loans to Turkey. This has led some persons
to question whether the Consortium has fulfilled any useful role in
helping Turkey achieve its development objectives.
Conceivably Turkey might have fared as well on a strictly financial
basis by dealing bilaterally with its many creditors, but this is unlikely.
Given the nearly bankrupt nature of Turkey's international finances at
the time of the 1960 revolution, some sort of consortium was inevitable.
And it was probably inevitable also that the Consortium would concern
itself to a large extent with managing its previous loans to Turkey. Un-
doubtedly its most beneficial role has been to force the planners to think
more in terms of specific projects than they had at the beginning of the
plan. Surely the most evident shortcoming of the original plan was that
it concentrated mainly on aggregate objectives (e.g. overall growth,
public savings, foreign aid) rather than on the specific projects needed
to create increased employment and productivity. While the Consortium
has not fulfilled the financial expectations of the Turkish planners, it has
undoubtedly been an important factor in the translation of a broad
development programme into concrete ideas and channels.
V
Aside from attempting to achieve a 7 per cent rate of G.N.P. growth,
another primary objective of Turkey's First Plan was to eliminate the need
for concessional-type loans by about 1972. The Second Plan (1968-72)
now expects that this will be achieved by 1975. Considering the likely
future developments of imports and exports-even if the overvaluation is
corrected and a tourist boom does materialize-this is unlikely.
The external debt amounted to about U.S. $1 billion at the beginning
of the First Plan, grew to over U.S. $1-5 billion by the end of 1967, and
may reach somewhere close to U.S. $2-5 billion by 1975-by far the world's
highest on a per capita basis.22 Servicing the present debt already imposes
a tremendous problem, the dimensions of which seem as likely to grow
as to decline during the coming years. The rather optimistic view of the
O.E.C.D. Consortium is that Turkey's balance of payments gap will
amount to about U.S. $200 million per year by 1975, including debt
servicing of approximately the same magnitude. In other words by 1975
Turkey may no longer requlre any net financial aid but will still need
about U.S. $200 million of gross assistance to repay outstanding debts.
It is not feasible to think of financing this requirement from new suppliers'
credits or other commercial loans, which within a very short while would
only aggravate the debt servicing problem. But by reducing its net
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financial assistance to zero and by only requiring enough gross aid to
roll over its outstanding debt, Turkey would be able to enter a more
advanced stage of its economic development by the beginning of the last
quarter of this century-a far cry from its former reputation as the 'sick
man of Europe'.
In spite of the shortfall in foreign financial assistance and the short-
comings of its own policies, Turkey's economic progress during the First
Plan period was substantial by any measure, and especially impressive
when compared with the distortion and misallocation of resources which
characterized the 1950s. In 1963 net foreign aid provided roughly 30 per
cent of Turkey's total investment funds; this was equivalent to more than
4 per cent of G.N.P.; by 1967 these figures were down to 8 and 12 per cent
respectively and-even allowing for some shortfalls of both growth and
foreign aid-the comparable figures in 1972 should not be more than
5 and 1 per cent respectively.23 Neither the continued willingness of nations
to contribute to Turkey's development nor the process of development
itself can be predicted with certainty. But the experience of the First Plan
suggests that during the Second Plan period, which began in 1968, Turkey
can expect to make substantial progress.
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Book Reviews
A note on the current research interests of members of staff in the Department
of Economic and Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies
London.
The Department of Economic and Political Studies, School of Oriental and
African Studies, has a staff of eight economists and seven political scientists,
with the following research interests:
1. ECONOMICS
Professor E. Penrose and Dr P. K. O'Brien are engaged in research on the
Middle East. Professor Penrose has a special interest in the economics of the oil
industry and is working on a study of Planning and the Growth of the Firm.
Dr O'Brien is preparing a book on the economic history of Egypt. Dr W. M.
Warren works on West African labour and wages, and the Department has two
economists working on India: Dr B. K. DasGupta is making a statistical study of
electoral behaviour in India (in conjunction with Professor W. H. Morris-Jones
of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies); Mr T. J. Byres is doing research on
the economics of mobilizing an agricultural 'surplus' in India. Mr P. Ayre, who is
interested in the trade and monetary problems of South-East Asia, is currently
working on balance of payments adjustment in the Philippines. Two economists
have research projects on Modern China. Mr C. B. Howe is working on urban
employment and Dr K. R. Walker on China's rural economic development. In
addition, the Department has organized an interdisciplinary project on land
utilization in Libya, under the direction of Dr K. S. McLachlan. The results of
extensive field work are now being analysed.
2. POLITICS
Professor Stuart Schram and Mr Geoffrey Shillinglaw are engaged in research
on contemporary China. Professor Schram, Head of the Contemporary China
Institute, has a special interest in the political ideology of China; Mr Shillinglaw,
Research Fellow in the Contemporary China Institute, is writing a Ph.D. thesis
on the subject of the politics of land reform in South Central China. Professor
P. J. Vatikiotis and Dr A. R. Kelidar are concerned with the politics of the Middle
East. Professor Vatikiotis has concentrated on Egypt and Jordan, particularly on
the military and politics of these countries; Dr Kelidar is involved in a study of
the emergence in Iraq of a political elite in 1920-32. Dr Ruth McVey deals with
the politics and history of South-East Asia, especially Communism and problems
of development in Indonesia. Dr Sriram Mehrotra has focused on the history and
politics of South Asia, and is currently completing the first volume of his history
of the Congress Party in India. Dr D. Cruise O'Brien is concerned with the
politics of West Africa. His Ph.D. thesis dealt with the Mourids of Senegal, and
his current research is on Senegalese clan politics, especially socio-economic
analysis of the involvement of religious leaders in politics.
Economic Theory: an Integrated Text with Special Reference to Tropical Africa
and Other Developing Areas. By P. W. Bell and M. P. Todaro. O. U.P. 1969.
This book was designed as a comprehensive textbook of economic theory for
second-year students at African universities, It covers broadly the same areas of
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